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GOLDMAN V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK:
ADAPTING THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
TO CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS AND
THE NUANCES OF OPEN END CREDIT
In 1968, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act' "to
assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the con-
sumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit."
'2
Congress provided guidelines for disclosure of the terms of
consumer credit transactions3 and encouraged compliance with
them by establishing civil penalties for a creditor's failure to
disclose consumer credit terms in the prescribed manner.4 A
plaintiff who successfully proves a violation of the Act will re-
cover, in addition to damages, court costs plus reasonable attor-
neys' fees. 5 The Act makes any cause of action arising under it
subject to a one year statute of limitations.
6
In Goldman v. First National Bank, 7 the Seventh Circuit con-
fronted two troublesome issues presented by the Truth in Lend-
ing Act-determination of when the Act's statute of limitations
begins to run and adaptation of class actions to litigation under
the Act. The limitations problem as applied to the "open end
I Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146
(1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by 15
U.S.C.A. 1601-1665 (West Supp. 2, 1976). The Federal Reserve Board, directed by
§§ 1604 and 1607 of the Act to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of the
Act, adopted Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1976) (effective July 1, 1969). Regulation
Z, as amended from time to time, the Federal Reserve Board Interpretations of Regula-
tion Z, and the Federal Reserve Board staff opinions, although "not binding on the
courts, are entitled to great weight, for they constitute part of the body of informed
experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate
authority." Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. .1974)
(quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973)); see
Taylor v. R.H. Macy & Co., 481 F.2d 178 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970) (amended 1976).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1639 (1970) (amended 1974).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970) (amended 1976).
' 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (originally codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(2) (1970)).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970) ("Any action under this section may be brought in any
United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one
year from the date of occurrence of the violation.").
7 532 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 183 (1976).
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credit plan ' 8 in Goldman was an issue of first impression. In cases
involving closed end plans, 9 other courts had construed strictly
the limitations provision, holding that it commences the moment
the credit transaction is consummated? ° Faced with the differ-
ent situation created by a lender making false and misleading
disclosures in the context of an open end credit plan, the court
held that the limitations period began to run on the date that a
finance charge was first imposed. The class action question en-
tailed determining whether the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to allow the suit to proceed as a class action under
the Truth in Lending Act. The Seventh Circuit perceived that
the district court's denial of class certification was based on bar-
riers to class actions made irrelevant by pasage of the 1974
amendments to the Act,11 but the court then overlooked new
problems posed by the amendments.
This Comment will examine the court's analysis of the stat-
ute of limitations issue, demonstrating that the court's reasoning
could be employed in future cases to undermine the congres-
sional objective of promoting compliance with the Truth in
Lending Act through private enforcement by denying some in-
jured consumers a valid cause of action under the Act. The
Comment also will explore aspects of the Seventh Circuit's reso-
lution of the class action question, concluding that the court's
failure to determine class size and composition precluded a
reasoned determination that the suit was manageable as a class
action and that the plaintiff was qualified to represent the class.
Finally, the Comment will analyze the effect of the statute of
limitations decision on the class action question, suggesting that
the interaction of these issues may make it advantageous for a
consumer with a cause of action to delay bringing a class action
or individual suit, at the same time making it more difficult for a
creditor to control or even estimate his potential liability for any
given year.
I For a discussion of the significant attributes of open end credit plans, see note 34
infra & accompanying text.
' For a definition of closed end credit plans, see text accompanying notes 32-33
infra.
"5 E.g., Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973);
Alpert v. United States Indus., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491, 498 (C.D. Cal. 1973). In Kristiansen
v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the court stated "that
without some Congressional intent to the contrary, it should not by construction in-
crease the defendant's liability beyond the one year from the date of the execution of
the contracts."
" Depository Institutions Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1518
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)).
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In a larger context, Goldman is directly relevant to the grow-
ing concern that class actions may serve as an invitation to solici-
tation and propagation of unnecessary litigation. 2 This Com-
ment will suggest that the entangling of statute of limitations and
class action problems may make individual suits more attractive
than class actions to some plaintiffs, while potentially depriving
other plaintiffs of their causes of action.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Truth in Lending Act
Before enactment of the Truth in Lending Act in 1968,
divergent-and at times fraudulent-practices used by creditors
to inform consumers of credit terms often prevented consumers
from shopping for the best terms available and sometimes
caused them to assume liabilities they could not meet.' 3 After
years of congressional study and debate, 14 the Act was passed in
a form designed to remedy such consumer credit problems. The
House Committee on Banking and Currency concluded that
by requiring all creditors to disclose credit information
in a uniform manner, and by requiring all additional
mandatory charges imposed by the creditor as an inci-
dent to credit be included in the computation of the
applicable percentage rate, the American consumer will
be given the information he needs to compare the cost
12 See Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) ("[C]lass actions ... threaten to engulf the courts; . . . substantial questions have
been raised whether the Rule . . . has resulted in miniscule recoveries by its intended
beneficiaries while lawyers have reaped a golden harvest of fees."); Buford v. American
Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ("[T]he plain truth is that in many
cases Rule 23(b)(3) is being used as a device for the solicitation of litigation."); Com-
ment, Involuntary Dismissals of Class Actions, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 783 (1973) ("The possibil-
ity of recovery of large attorney's fees has led to an inundation of the federal courts
with class actions, many of which have little merit or are of negligible importance to
class members." (footnote omitted)).
1: H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1970.
14 Congress evinced concern over the usefulness and propriety of imposing man-
datory disclosure requirements on those who extend consumer credit. From the end of
World War II through 1967, the amount of consumer credit outstanding increased
from $5.6 billion to $95.9 billion, a rate of growth more than 4 times as great as that
of the economy. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1967), reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1966-69. Nonetheless, many consumers
remained ignorant of the costs of deferring payment and the nature of their credit
obligations. Id. 13, [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1970; S. REP. No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:635
of credit and to make the best informed decision on the
use of credit.
15
Although primary enforcement of the Act is the responsibility of
the Federal Reserve Board, 16 further provision is made in sec-
tion 130 "for the institution of civil action by an aggrieved
debtor."' 7 The original section 130 fixed damages for noncom-
pliance with the uniform disclosure provisions of the Act' 8 at
"twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the
transaction,"' 9 subject to a minimum award of $100 and a max-
imum award of $1000.20 The plaintiff's cause of action in
Goldman arose under this original version of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act.
B. The Factual Setting of Goldman
On April 3, 1970, plaintiff Steven Goldman applied to the
First National Bank of Chicago for a BankAmericard credit card
on a printed form prepared by the bank. This form included the
bank's contract with its cardholders (BankAmericard Agree-
ment) and a section labeled "Disclosure Statement As Required
by the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act."'2 ' The BankAmericard
Agreement provided that "[i]n respect to credit purchases, ...
[f]inance charges shall commence 25 days from billing date."22
This statement, ultimately proven false,2 3 was the center of the
controversy.
11 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong.. 1st Sess. 13 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962, 1970.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
"7 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1976; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (West Supp. 2, 1976).
1s 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1639 (1970) (amended 1975).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 2, 1976)).
2 0
1Id.
21 532 F.2d at 12.
22 Id. at 13.
23 The bank argued that, assuming the sentence were false, its inconsistency with
the required disclosures in the Disclosure Statement and each periodic billing statement
should have alerted the defendant to the discrepancy immediately. Brief for Appellant
at 35. A careful reading of the Disclosure Statement and the periodic billing statements,
however, reveals nothing that contadicts the disputed sentence in the BankAmericard
Agreement. See 532 F.2d at 12-13; Brief for Appellant, app. at 33-34. Although the
Disclosure Statement states conspicuously that the "FINANCE CHARGE for Cash
Advances begins on the date the cash advance is made (emphasis supplied)," it never
states when the finance charge for merchandise purchases begins. 532 F.2d at 12-13; Brief
for Appellant, app. at 33-34. Furthermore, because the bank was not required by the
Truth in Lending Act to disclose the date on which finance charges would begin, see 15
U.S.C. § 1637 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), the absence of this information on the Disclosure
Statement and periodic billing statements would not have indicated to the plaintiff that
something was wrong.
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The defendant bank approved Goldman's application in
April 1970 and sent him his credit card shortly thereafter.
Goldman first used his card on July 1, 1970, and made addi-
tional purchases with it during the remainder of the year. From
September 1970 through January 1971, he paid the entire bal-
ance shown on each billing statement within the twenty-five day
"free ride" period;24 consequently, he did not incur any finance
charges for those months. The bank, however, did not receive
Goldman's check for his February 8, 1971 billing statement until
March 9, 1971. Because payment had not been made within
twenty-five days from billing, the bank included a finance charge
of $1.19 in its March 8 billing statement. The plaintiff alleged
that this amount represented a finance charge for the period
from February 9 to March 8, at the rate of 1.5 percent per
month. Referring to the BankAmericard Agreement,2 Goldman
argued that the appropriate finance charge was thirteen cents,
representing the charge for the three days between the end of
the twenty-five day "free ride" period and the March 8 billing
date. He filed a complaint under the Truth in Lending Act on
July 8, 1971 on behalf of himself and a class of BankAmericard
holders similarly situated, alleging that the defendant had made
a false and misleading disclosure in violation of the Act.
26
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS QUESTION
Goldman filed his complaint more than one year after he
had applied for credit from the bank. The district court2 7 held
The bank also argued that the sentence meant only that the bank's right to collect
finance charges vested 25 days after the billing date. Brief for Appellant at 36. The
bank's interpretation, however, defies the plain language of the sentence; even if such
an interpretation could be justified, the sentence would violate the requirement that the
disclosure be made "clearly." 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970) (amended 1974). Additionally,
if the sentence in fact referred only to the date the bank's right to collect finance
charges vested, then nothing in the Disclosure Statement or the BankAmericard
Agreement told the consumer about the very important date from which finance
charges would be computed.
24 Each billing statement included the following information:
4 .... FINANCE CHARGE" at the rate of 1 '% per month for "MER-
CHANDISE PURCHASES" is charged to your account on your next
billing date.., unless the "NEW BALANCE" on this statement is paid
in full within 25 days after your billing date.
532 F.2d at 13.2 5
See text accompanying note 22 supra.
26 Although the Act condemns specifically only not disclosing the required informa-
tion, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1640 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), Goldman contended, and the
court agreed, that a false or misleading disclosure is also a violation of the Act. See 532
F.2d at 18; text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
27 There were two lower court opinions in this case. The statute of limitations ques-
tion was decided in Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 392 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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Goldman's claim to be barred by the Act's statute of limitations.28
The trial judge concluded that
the purpose of the statute is to provide full disclosure to
the consumer of the cost of using credit to the end that
he may more intelliglently use it. Disclosure is what
Congress intended. Violation of the disclosure provision
must occur, if at all, sometime before the first transac-
tion occurs. In this case, disclosure occurred when de-
fendant [sic] received and accepted the card from the
defendant in April or May, 1970, or, at the very latest,
on July 1, 1970 when plaintiff first used the card. Thus,
the statute of limitations bars this action since the com-
plaint was filed July 8, 1971, more than one year after
the disclosure was made.29
The district court noted the uniqueness of this case; 30 with one
exception, 31 previous cases dealing with the Truth in Lending
Act's statute of limitations involved "closed end credit transac-
tions" under sections 128 and 129 of the Act.32 In a closed end
plan, "the finance charge is divided into the term of the loan
and incorporated into the time payments and thus the rate is
computable by the consumer from the time he receives his
first billing." 33 A consumer who makes a closed end credit trans-
action can, therefore, determine after his first billing statement
whether the creditor has omitted a required disclosure, or has
made a false or misleading statement.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970); see note 6supra.
29 392 F. Supp. at 218. The reported opinion contains an error. The court obvi-
ously meant to say "disclosure occurred when plaintiff received and accepted the card
from the defendant ....
31Id. at 216.
31 White v. Central Charge Serv., Inc., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 99,170 (D.C. Super. 1972), is the one reported case involving an open
end credit plan. In White, the plaintiff alleged a violation of § 1637(b)(2) of the Act,
requiring inclusion of a description of the goods purchased on the periodic billing
statement sent to the customer. The absence of this disclosure on the billing statement
gave immediate notice to the plaintiff that a violation had occurred; consequently, the
White court held that the statute of limitations ran from the date that the statement was
received. White is therefore analogous to an omission in the disclosure statement that
would immediately alert the consumer that a violation had been committed. See text
accompanying notes 38-62 infra. White provides no guidance, however, in a situation
where, as in Goldman, the violation alleged is a false or misleading disclosure. See 532
F.2d at 17 n.10; text accompanying notes 45-71 infra.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638-1639 (1970); see, e.g., Stevens v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 497
F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974); Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 874 (1973).
33 532 F.2d at 19.
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The credit arrangement involved in Goldman on the other
hand, was an open end credit plan.
An open end credit plan is one in which credit
terms are initially established with the opening of the
account, but no fixed amount of debt is incurred at that
time. Purchases made from time to time are added to
the outstanding balance in the account, and each new
purchase represents an additional extension of credit
under the terms as originally defined in the credit
agreement.
34
Goldman argued that discovery of a violation of the Act's dis-
closure requirements is more difficult under an open end plan,
and that the difference between the two types of plans should
affect the determination of when the statute of limitations begins
to run.35 In support of his contention, he presented the follow-
ing four theories in the circuit court: (1) that the bank's repeated
failure to disclose the true finance charge constitued a series of
"continuing violations," (2) that the bank's fraudulent conceal-
ment of the amount of the finance charge tolled the statute of
limitations, (3) that no cause of action accrues in an open end
plan until a finance charge is imposed, and (4) that notice of the
Act's violation, required for running the statute of limitations by
both congressional intent and equitable considerations, is not
given in an open end credit plan until a finance charge is im-
posed.'
Like the district court, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with
Goldman's contention that the bank's disclosure violation was
"continuing. ' 3 It referred to earlier cases involving closed end
plans, most notably Wachtel v. West, 38 that rejected the "continu-
ing violation" theory and held that there is a specific time at
which a disclosure violation takes place-usually the time that
the credit contract between the borrower and lender is made or,
at the latest, the time credit is first extended.39 Although ulti-
34 532 F.2d at 17 n.ll (7th Cir. 1976); see 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1970) ("The term
'open end credit plan' refers to a plan prescribing the terms of credit transactions which
may be thereunder from time to time and under the terms of which a finance charge
may be computed on the outstanding unpaid balance from time to time thereunder.");
FRB Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(r), .2(x), .203 (1976).
35 532 F.2d at 17.
36
1d. at 17-18 & n.12.
37 Id. at 20; see Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 392 F. Supp. 214, 217-18 (N.D. Ill.
1975); note 44 infra.
38 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
11 In Wachtel, the Sixth Circuit concluded that in order to fulfill the Act's purpose
19771
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mately not choosing the same point from which to measure the
limitations period,4" the Goldman circuit court, relying on the
earlier cases and the language of the Act itself,4 nonetheless
found that when "there is a violation of the Act in an open end
credit plan, it occurs at the time the account is opened, or at the
very latest, some time before the first transaction takes place.
42
In both closed and open end credit plans, if there is no disclo-
sure as required by the Truth in Lending Act, the consumer can
discover the violation immediately by comparing the disclosure
statements with the relevant section of the Act.43 Thus, the court
of allowing the consumer to make a "meaningful" credit decision, it is necessary that he
have the required information in his possession before he becomes committed to any
particular lender. This conclusion is supported by 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970), which
directs that the disclosures required in 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) (1970) (loan transactions) be
made "before credit is extended." Because the Act fails to specify when credit is
deemed extended, the court looked to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Z,
which, defining the time at which a transaction is "consummated," states: "A transaction
shall be considered consummated at the time a contractual relationship is created be-
tween a creditor and a customer irrespective of the time of performance of either
party." FRB Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(kk) (1976). The Wachtel court concluded
that a credit transaction requiring disclosure under the Act is completed when the len-
der and borrower contract for the extension of credit. In the absence of proper dis-
closure, therefore, violation of the Act takes place at the time-of contracting, or, at the
very latest, at the time of performance; it does not occur continuously. 476 F.2d at
1065.
Subsequent cases generally have agreed that there is a specific time at which a
violation of the disclosure requirements takes place and that the limitations period runs
from that time. For example, in Stevens v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 307, 309
(10th Cir. 1974), the court remarked:
While in this opinion we do not necessarily adopt the Sixth Circuit's reference
to the date of "performance" as the date on which the violation occurs, we
nevertheless agree generally with the proposition that violation of the disclo-
sure requirements . . . occurs at a specific time from which the statute will then
run. Thus it does not necessarily become a continuing failure or breach.
See Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally
Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975).
40 See text accompanying notes 45-71 infra.
"See 532 F.2d at 20; 15 U.S.C. § 164 0(g) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640 (1970)).
42 532 F.2d at 20. At this point the court also states: "Goldman's argument that
there has not been a completed 'transaction' through which a violation could occur until
a finance charge is imposed, therefore, is incorrect." Id. This statement, however, is
only partially true; the argument attributed to Goldman is incorrect insofar as it relies
exclusively on the notion that a completed transaction does not take place in an open
end credit plan until a finance charge has been imposed. See text accompanying note 43
infra. Locating the time at which the transaction was completed, however, was not the
thrust of Goldman's contention. His argument focused instead on the statute of limita-
tions: the period of limitations begins running only when a completed transaction has
had its unlawful impact upon plaintiff. Brief for Appellant at 6. The underlying premise
of this argument was that when the characteristics of the open end credit plan were
coupled with a false, misleading, or inaccurate disclosure, the consumer could not de-
tect the violation prior to the imposition of a finance charge. See 532 F.2d at 19.
43 532 F.2d at 17.
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rejected the argument that in an open end credit plan "the duty
to disclose mandates that until disclosure is made as required by
the Act, a violation continues and thus the statute is tolled.
44
The Seventh Circuit, however, did not terminate its analysis
at this point. Unlike the district court, it proceeded to consider
another distinction between preceding cases and the case before
it. In the earlier cases the lenders had made no disclosure of
credit terms as required by the Act;45 in Goldman there was dis-
closure, but it was, allegedly, misleading. Goldman contended
that false or misleading disclosures are equivalent to nondisclo-
sure under the Act, but that discovery of the violation by the
injured consumer is nearly impossible in such situations until a
finance charge has been imposed. Therefore, he argued, "the
relevant date for the limitations period should be the date on
which the [finance) charge was first assessed.
' 46
The court agreed with Goldman that, although the Act on
its face condemns only "not disclosing" credit terms,47 a false or
misleading disclosure was a violation of the Truth in Lending
Act no less than nondisclosure. Taking its cue from the stated
purpose of the Act "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms, '48 the Seventh Circuit found that the congressional intent
to protect consumers from "the uninformed use of credit"
49
would be frustrated unless the Act were so construed.
50
In assessing whether an action based on a misleading dis-
closure is subject to a different limitations period than one
arising out of nondisclosure, the court declined to consider
Goldman's fraudulent concealment theory.51 Without discussing
"Id. at 20. Similarly, the district court analyzing the earlier cases and holding that
they were not controlling because they did not deal with a transaction under an open
end credit plan, nevertheless determined that under an open end plan disclosure viola-
tions are not continuing and that "the violation occurs when the credit contract is exe-
cuted." 392 F. Supp. at 217; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
45 532 F.2d at 20.
46
d. at 17.
" Id. at 18; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637-1640 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
48 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975). Language added by the 1974 amendments
makes this argument even stronger. The amended declaration of purpose adds that the
Act is "to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair billing and credit card
practices." Id.
49 Id.
50 532 F.2d at 18.
51 1d. at 20-21.
The federal doctrine of fraudulent concealment was announced by the Supreme
Court in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874):
[,V]here the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any
fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not
begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circum-
19771
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separately the plaintiff's remaining two theories,5 2 it found "the
stated legislative intent, '53 "the unique but somewhat problem-
atic nature of open end credit arrangements," 54 and "other con-
siderations"'5, sufficient to decide that where "there has been an
incomplete, inaccurate or misleading disclosure, the limitations
period should not be measured from the date the disclosure was
required by law to be made, but instead by the date on which a
finance charge was first imposed." 56
Goldman averred that the district court's interpretation of
the limitations provision frustrated the intent of Congress to
protect consumers from "the uninformed use of credit. '5 7 Con-
sumers would not be protected effectively if their suit were
stances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it
from the knowledge of the other party.
Although this doctrine was first introduced in equity, it is equally applicable in cases
involving legal actions. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349 (dictum); Morgan v.
Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1969); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784 (lst
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d
80, 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821 (1961). "This equitable doctrine is read into
every federal statute of limitation." Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
Goldman's fraudulent concealment argument was twofold: (1) the bank "actively"
and intentionally concealed its method of determining the finance charge, or (2) even if
the bank had not attempted actively to conceal the misrepresentation, the statute of
limitations should not begin to run until the consumer has had an opportunity to per-
ceive that a violation has occurred. The first argument is without merit because Gold-
man never introduced any evidence that the scienter necessary to prove fraud was pres-
ent in this case. See Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 1282, 1284-85 (E.D. Pa.
1974) ("While the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may well have application to vio-
lations under Truth-in-Lending, this could only be where a fraudulent intention pre-
vented the requisite disclosure. This would require at the least that defendants have
known they were violating the provisons of the Act."). See generally Dawson, Fraudulent
Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REv. 875 (1933). Goldman's second
argument technically is not based on fraudulent concealment because it incorporates
equitable considerations that may pertain in the absence of fraud. See Quinton v.
United States, 304 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1962) (In a claim for medical malpractice
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
claimant "discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the acts constituting the alleged malpractice." (footnote omitted)); Hungerford v.
United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962). Although declaring it unnecessary to con-
sider this contention, the Goldman court nonetheless evinced concern for these equity
arguments. See text accompanying notes 57-63, 68-71 infra.
5'2 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
n 532 F.2d at 21; see text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
4 532 F.2d at 21; see note 34 supra & accompanying text.
s 532 F.2d at 21; see text accompanying notes 64-71 infra.
6 d. The court subsequently obfuscates the matter by limiting the holding "to the
unique and narrow set of circumstances presented in open end credit plans." Id. at 22.
It is true that the holding of this case is inapposite in a case involving a closed end
credit plan. See text accompanying note 33 supra. Nevertheless, this statement is incom-
plete because the presence of the false or misleading disclosure is a necessary prerequi-
site for this decision.
57 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975); see note 48 supra & accompanying text.
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barred by the statute of limitations before they had an opportu-
nity to know of the violation. Finding this argument persua-
sive,58 the Seventh Circuit was apparently "guided by the fami-
liar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes."59 The
court's broad interpretation is consistent with cases holding that
the Truth in Lending Act is remedial in nature and should be
construed liberally in favor of the consumer: 60 "Since the civil
penalty prescribed [in 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)] is modest and
the prohibited conduct clearly set out in the regulation, we need
not construe this section as narrowly as a criminal statute provid-
ing graver penalties .... 16 A limitations statute is most properly
interpreted "in the light of the general purposes of the statute
and of its other provisions, and with due regard to those practi-
cal ends which are to be served by any limitation of the time
within which an action must be brought. ' 62 The remedial pur-
pose of the Truth in Lending Act strongly suggests that Con-
gress did not intend the one year limitations period to begin to
run against the consumer until the consumer's right "has ac-
crued in a shape to be effectively enforced. 63
58 532 F.2d at 21. Justice Stevens' evaluation of this legislative intent argument is
unclear from his terse and cryptic dissent. He ostensibly takes a strict constructionist
approach to the statute because he bases his dissent on the fact that Congress enacted
the same limitations provision for both open end and closed end transactions. 532 F.2d
at 22. The majority, however, did not base its decision solely on the nature of the plan,
but rather on the ramifications of the false disclosure in the context of the open end
credit plan. See note 56 supra. Justice Stevens does not discuss the considerations raised
by the nature of the disclosure. One possible explanation is that he rejected the distinc-
tion sub silentio because the statute does not explicitly proscribe false or misleading
disclosures. See notes 47-50 supra & accompanying text. Such a rejection is also consis-
tent with a strict constructionist approach. It is perplexing, however, that in the face of
this statutory language, which required the court to interpret legislative intent to de-
termine that Goldman had even stated a cause of action, Justice Stevens' approach did
not lead him to conclude that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim under the Truth in Lending Act.
59 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); see Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54, 65 (1968).
6 0 See, e.g., Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975); Eby v. Reb Realty,
Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Gardner & North Roofing & Siding
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
61 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376 (1973); see Thomas
v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally
Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1974).
62 Crown Coat Front Co v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517 (1967) (quoting Read-
ing Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62 (1926)); see Osmers v. Parade Publications, Inc., 234
F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
63 United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 418 (1938) (quoting Borer v. Chapman,
119 U.S. 587, 602 (1887)); see, e.g., cases cited in United States v. One 1961 Red Chev-
rolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353, 1358 (5th Cir. 1972).
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The circuit court also emphasized the importance of the
imposition of a finance charge in the legislative scheme. 64 It
noted that the finance charge is the central consideration in the
measure of damages imposed by the statute. Despite the fact that
liability may be found even where no finance charge is as-
sessed,65 the court concluded that the imposition of a finance
charge was clearly contemplated as the event that would usually
give rise to suit under the Act.6 6 The court added that in a case
of inaccurate disclosure under an open end credit plan, the im-
position of a finance charge "is a necessary condition for the
assessment of liability since it is this charge against which the
accuracy of the disclosure must be measured .... Until a finance
charge is levied the debtor has no cause for complaint since
there has been no action inconsistent with the inaccurate dis-
closure.
67
The Goldman court bolstered its decision with reference to
"those cases which designate as the time from which a statute of
limitations begin [sic] to run the date at which the last significant
event necessary to make the claim suable occurs. ' 68 A claim is
not "suable" until after notice of an invasion of one's legal
rights; 69 before that time the injury is unknown, and legal action
cannot be taken. By finding the proposition "irrefutable" that, in
the context of an open end credit plan, "when the disclosure
statement is false, incomplete or inaccurate it is not until the
imposition of the first finance charge that the debtor can per-
ceive that a violation [of the Truth in Lending Act] has oc-
curred,' 70 the Seventh Circuit in effect found that the debtor's
claim was not "suable" until a finance charge was assessed. Thus,
Goldman's claim was held not to be barred by the statute of
limitations. 7'
Although the Seventh Circuit enforced the Truth in Lend-
64 532 F.2d at 21.
6 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
66 532 F.2d at 21. In certain instances, the critical date for commencing the statute
of limitations "is the point at which the injury becomes apparent." Cooper v. United
States, 442 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1971). See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200-07 (1950).
67 532 F.2d at 21.
66 Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 (1938); Mack Trucks, Inc.
v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 372 F.2d 18 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 930 (1967)). See also Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Hughes v. Swinehart, 376 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
69 See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
71 532 F.2d at 19.
71 Id. at 22.
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ing Act's statute of limitations consistently with congressional in-
tent in this circumstance, 2 in so doing the court employed broad
language that could be construed in other contexts to contravene
the purposes of the Act. The court stated that "[t]he imposition
of a finance charge under an open end credit plan in which an
inaccurate disclosure has been made is a necessary condition for the
assessment of liability since it is this charge against which the accu-
racy of the disclosure must be measured. ' 73 The implication is
that under these circumstances the creditor is not liable for vio-
lating the Act unless and until he imposes a finance charge upon
the consumer in a manner inconsistent with the false disclo-
sure; 74 consequently, a consumer who is misled by a false dis-
closure would have no cause of action until a finance charge is
imposed.
75
The court's broad language may have been partially a result
of a failure to analyze separately two distinct theories of the
plaintiff-accrual of a cause of action and notice of a cause of
action. 6 Determining when the injury occurred or a cause of
action arose was unnecessary for deciding when the statute of
limitations began to run. It became apparent that the plaintiff
had been injured by the false disclosure only upon imposition of
the finance charge. Accordingly, the Goldman court could have
held the statute of limitations tolled on equitable grounds until
then-the first time the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of
his injury.77 Such a result would be reasonable whether the ac-
tual injury had occurred at the time the finance charge was
imposed or at some prior time.
More importantly, the court's unnecessary conclusion may
have the undesirable effect of denying a valid cause of action
under the Truth in Lending Act to a consumer (either as an
individual or a member of a group bringing a class action) who
has been injured by a false disclosure and becomes aware of it
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
73 532 F.2d at 21 (emphasis supplied).
74 Technically, another interpretation of the court's reasoning is possible. The
Seventh Circuit noted that imposition of a finance charge "is not the only event which
may precipitate an action ...." 532 F.2d at 21. The circuit court deemed this caveat
"immaterial" to the facts of Goldman. Id. But the statement may herald a flexible ap-
proach to the statute of limitations problem that remains mindful of congressional in-
tent to protect the consumer. This reading comports with the Goldman court's discussion
of Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), where the Su-
preme Court asserted that Congress did not attempt to list all the situations where the
Act might apply. See 532 F.2d at 21 n.18.
5 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
7 See text accompanying notes 36 & 52 supra.
"See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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without incurring a finance charge. Although in most cases im-
position of a finance charge is necessary before a consumer can
perceive that he has been victimized by a false or misleading
disclosure, 78 the consumer may suffer actual injury before that
time. For example, he may select credit card A instead of credit
card B because a "false" disclosure made A's credit terms appear
more advantageous to him. 79 Based on his own evaluation of his
needs and desires, the consumer, therefore, will have chosen a
card that is less beneficial to him and will have forfeited irre-
trievably the extra benefits offered by card B during the time
that he was unaware of card A's "false" disclosure. 80 Addition-
ally, he may at that point be unable to acquire readily credit card
B .81 Although a consumer in this situation may have difficulty
establishing monetary damages, he will have suffered an injury
nevertheless, and be entitled to a cause of action.
The contention that the consumer has no cause for com-
plaint until a finance charge is imposed is inconsistent with the
Truth in Lending Act's aim of assuring "a meaningful disclosure
7B A consumer may learn that a false disclosure was made to him without having a
finance charge imposed on his statement. For example, he may be informed by a friend
who has had a finance charge imposed on his own statement.
79 Such a proposition may, at first glance, appear tenuous in the context of bank
credit cards such as BankAmericard and Master Charge. In the absence of any issuing
charge, the consumer can simply apply for both cards. He may be wise not to do so,
however. For example, a consumer may wish to use only one of the cards in order to
simplify his bill paying and financial accounting. The consumer also may desire to
minimize his number of credit cards, perhaps because of fear of loss or theft, and keep
only one for special or emergency use. The proposition is even stronger, however,
when considered in the context of such prestigious credit cards as American Express
and Diners' Club. These creditors charge their cardholders as annual fee for the
privilege of using their card; consequently, a consumer could reasonably conclude that
he can only afford to hold one of these two cards, especially since they are similar in
many respects. Even a consumer who obtains both cards may be disadvantaged. Sup-
pose he either utilizes both cards or exclusively employs the card that later turns out to
be less beneficial. Despite owning both cards, the consumer is injured to the extent that
he used the less advantageous credit card. Of course, the amount of the injury may well
depend upon the nature of the false or misleading disclosure.
80 For example, American Express provides each of its cardholders with a $25,000
travel accident life insurance policy. Similarly, Diners' Club gives each of its members a
subscription to a magazine that it sponsors. A consumer who originally chose American
Express has been deprived of receiving those issues of the Diners' Club magazine sent
out during that time period. Conversely, a consumer who originally chose Diners' Club
has been forced to either purchase insurance for a few dollars each time he travels or
deny himself the piece of mind engendered by having the insurance. More dramati-
cally, he might have chosen to travel without the insurance and died in an accident
uninsured.
8, For example, having paid the annual fee for credit card A he may be unable to
afford to pay another fee for credit card B. Additionally, his financial situation may
have changed (perhaps he was laid off from his job) since he chose credit card A and
he may no longer satisfy the requirements for obtaining credit card B.
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of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him ... ."82
Although the consumer may have no reason to believe that a
disclosure is false until a finance charge is imposed in a manner
inconsistent with the disclosure, the bank actually renders the
disclosure "false" as soon as it imposes an inconsistent finance
charge on any of its customers. Consequently, although the con-
sumer cannot perceive from his own records that the bank has
made a false disclosure to him, the bank has nevertheless vio-
lated the Act. The imposition of a finance charge is usually the
event impelling suit under the Act; liability may be found, how-
ever, in the absence of the imposition of a finance charge.
83
The remedy provided by the Truth in Lending Act indicates
that a cause of action arises even in cases in which no finance
charge has been imposed on the plaintiff. Actual damages are
not a prerequisite to recovery of the statutory damages provided
in section 130.84 The congressional intent in this circumstance
has been stated by a federal district court in a manner inconsis-
tent with the expansive language in Goldman:
Beyond using the finance charge as such an available
and handy reference point, presumably to be replaced
in the normal case by the $100 minimum or $1,000
maximum, Congress made clear its broader scheme,
and broader system of reimbursement, for private en-
forcement. It invited people like the present plaintiff,
whether they were themselves deceived or not, to sue in the
public interest. Following familiar precedents, it en-
couraged such actions by providing, in addition to the
incentive of public service, costs and a reasonable at-
torney's fee above the minimum recovery of $100.85
82 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975). Since one purpose of the statute is to allow
consumers to make informed choices, public policy should favor notification of any
misleading or false disclosures at the earliest possible time. Allowing a cause of action to
accrue as soon as a falsity is discovered would encourage consumers who gain knowl-
edge of such false or misleading disclosures to institute suit immediately rather than
wait for imposition of a finance charge. This would benefit both consumers and cred-
itors because early discovery would tend to limit the number of consumers deceived
and consequentially limit the total amount of potential damages.
83 532 F.2d at 21; see Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356
(1973).
84 Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
accord, Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376. But see White v.
Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 151 (D. Md. 1974).
85 Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit's restrictive interpretation of when
the cause of action accrued arguably tends to undermine the
mechanism of private enforcement instituted by Congress to
promote compliance with the Act.
III. CLASS ACTION QUESTION
Coupling the penalty originally prescribed by the Truth in
Lending Act with the class action provisions of rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a situation with appar-
ently unforeseen and unintended destructive potential.8 6 Con-
sumer advocates instituting class actions to recover the Act's
minimum damages of $100 for themselves and all others simi-
larly situated often sought enormous damages awards. 87 Because
such sizable claims threatened to destroy even the largest of the
thousands of lenders who regularly extend credit to consumers,
the courts were reluctant to sanction class action suits in the
absence of an explicit congressional directive.
8 8
The quintessential class action case under the original sec-
tion 130 was Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 9 Less
than three months after the Truth in Lending Act became effec-
tive, a Chemical Bank credit card customer filed suit against the
bank, alleging that the bank's monthly Master Charge statement
violated the Act by failing to disclose the annual percentage rate
of the finance charge. 90 Plaintiff sought to recover the Act's
minimum damages of $100 for himself and each of the approx-
imately 130,000 similarly situated Chemical Bank credit card
customers. The court ruled that Chemical Bank's failure to dis-
close the nominal annual percentage rate constituted a violation
of the Act even though no finance charge was imposed during
86 No significant discussion of class actions appears anywhere in the legislative his-
tory of the Truth in Lending Act as it was originally enacted. See Wilcox v. Commerce
Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1973); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D.
602, 611 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J.
1410, 1411 n.10 (1974).
17 See, e.g., Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dam-
ages claims of $8 billion); Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972)
(damages claims in excess of$1 billion).
88 For an extensive list of the numerous federal district courts that have considered
the appropriateness of class actions under the original Truth in Lending Act, see
Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 607 n.9 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
89 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). This opinion decided whether the action pursued
under the Act could be maintained as a class action. The same case at an earlier stage
was reported at 329 F. Supp. 270, deciding the question whether there was a disclosure
violation under the Act. See note 90 infra & accompanying text.
9' Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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the month for which the periodic disclosure statement was is-
sued.91 Consequently, the question of class certification pre-
sented Judge Frankel, who had previously decided the question
of liability,9 2 with two alternatives: certify the class and assess the
bank with damages totalling roughly $13 million, or deny the
plaintiff's motion for class certification and award him the
statutory minimum of $100 plus costs and attorneys' fees.
93
Judge Frankel, in opting for the second alternative, appar-
ently assumed that the plaintiff satisfied the prerequisites to
maintaining a class action set out in rule 23(a). 94 Analyzing the
case from the perspective of the additional requirements for
maintaining a class action set forth in rule 23(b), 95 Judge Frankel
summarily rejected the plaintiff's efforts to rely on 23(b)(1). 96
After conceding that the plaintiff had made a prima facie show-
ing that the conditions of 23(b)(3) were fulfilled, Judge Frankel
91 Id. at 280.
92 See note 89 supra.
93 54 F.R.D. at 414.
94 Judge Frankel did not discuss the prerequisites to maintenance of a class action
listed in rule 23(a). The full text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) specifies:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
9- The full text of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) specifies:
Class Actions Maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by
or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsis-
tent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or im-
pede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action.
96 54 F.R.D. at 415.
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articulated two reasons persuading him that a class action in this
instance was not "superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy":
(1) The incentive of class-action benefits is unnecessary
in view of the Act's provisions for a $100 minimum
recovery and payment of costs and a reasonable fee
for counsel; and
(2) the proposed recovery of $100 each from some
130,000 class members would be a horrendous, pos-
sibly annihiliating punishment, unrelated to any
damage to the purported class or to any benefit to
defendant, for what is at most a technical and debat-
able violation of the Truth in Lending Act.
97
Although Judge Frankel carefully limited his decision to the
facts of the case at bar,98 his reasoning was adopted enthusiasti-
cally by several courts subsequently faced with Truth in Lending
class certification motions. 99
Goldman's class certification motion, ruled on only seven
months after Ratner was decided,1 °0 was denied by the district
9 7Id. at 416. Neither of these justifications fails within the four pertinent considera-
tions set out in rule 23(b)(3). See note 95 supra.
98 See 54 F.R.D. at 413.
'9 In the two year period following Ratner, federal district courts in at least 36
different Truth in Lending suits denied motions for class certifications. E.g., cases cited
in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 763 n.9 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974); Alpert v. United States Indus., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491, 500 (C.D. Cal.
1973). In nearly all of these cases, the courts relied on Ratner to support the conclusion
that a class action, with its potentially destructive effect, was not superior to an indi-
vidual suit for statutory damages. During this same period, only two district courts
considered and explicitly rejected the Ratner rationale. See Kristiansen v. John Mullins &
Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
Other courts have objected to an attorney's representing the class as plaintiff in
these suits because the prospect of an award of attorney's fees in a successful action
made it questionable whether the best interests of the class were his primary concerns.
See Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Shields v. Valley Nat'l
Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D. Ariz. 1971); cf. Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D.
104 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (plaintiff-attorney could not "fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class" because his testimony would necessitate the withdrawal of his own
firm as counsel). Still other courts have held that a class action is not superior to an
individual action under section 130(a) because of its "potential for abuse." Alpert v.
United States Indus., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491, 500 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Wilcox v. Commerce
Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 137 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Buford
v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971). In Berkman v. Sinclair
Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 609 (N.D. Il1. 1973), the court noted that the defendant had a
"plethora" of small claims against delinquent credit card holders that might have to be
asserted as compulsory counterclaims, which would result in the suit being wholly un-
manageable as a class action.
100 Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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court on the ground that the action did not fall within any of the
categories of rule 23(b). 101 District Judge Bauer prefaced his
consideration of the applicability of subsections two and three of
rule 23(b) with a discussion of the original section 130(a) pre-
scription of a minimum recovery of $100 without differentiation
between individual and class actions. 02 Influenced by the pros-
pect of a crushing damages award, he relied on Judge Frankel's
language in Ratner to conclude that a class action in this case
would not be "'superior' to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy."' 1 3 The district
court opinion also quoted Judge Frankel's conclusion that allow-
ing a class action in such a case is "essentially inconsistent with
the specific remedy supplied by Congress ....
Congress eventually became aware of the problems created
by class actions under the original Truth in Lending Act.'0 5 Al-
though the congressional response to these problems was some-
what tardy, once Congress appreciated the destructive' potential
inherent in a class action filed under the original section 130 it
resolved that the potential should be limited. Accordingly, sec-
101 Id. The district court found that subsections one, two, and three of rule 23(a)
were satisfied, but failed to reach a conclusion regarding subsection four, due to the
nature of its disposition of the motion based on rule 23(b). See Goldman v. First Nat'l
Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 13 n.4 (7th Cir. 1976).
102 Goldman attempted in his amended complaint to disclaim the minimum statu-
tory amount on behalf of himself and all other members of the class. The district court
concluded that a representative plaintiff had no authority to make this disclaimer on
behalf of the other class members but could waive the statutory minimum only for
himself; he then could not act as the representative of the class, however, because he
would not have interests in common with other class members. 56 F.R.D. at 592 n.4.
10: 56 F.R.D. at 593.
IId. (quoting Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
105 In its annual report for 1971, the Federal Reserve Board noted the existence of
at least 49 Truth in Lending class actions and advised Congress that
[c]reditors have been expressing increased concern over their possible expo-
sure to class action suits and the potential ruinous liability which may be at-
tached to such suits. While the question of class action liability in the Ratner
case ... has not yet been decided, the reported $13 million potential liability
has led many creditors to believe that similar suits filed against them could
seriously threaten the solvency or future existence of their organizations.
[1971] FRB ANN. RE'. TO CONG. ON TRUTH IN LENDING 18. The Board recommended
that Congress consider amending the Act "to set a maximum liability, or otherwise
restrict the scope of potential class action liability, should it finally be determined that
class actions are allowable in Truth in Lending suits." Id.
For a discussion of the congressional response to this recommendation, see Fischer,
From Ratner to Qui Tam: Truth-in-Lending Class Action Developments, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 813,
838-45 (1973); Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410,
1428-32 (1974). See generally Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions
and Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1974); Note, Class Actions Under the Truth
in Lending Act, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1305 (1972).
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tion 130 was amended, effective October 28, 1974, to limit the
maximum damages permissible in a Truth in Lending class ac-
tion to the lesser of $100,000 or one percent of the creditor's net
worth.10 6 Congress adopted this approach as a reasonable com-
promise between class actions with unlimited damages, proposed
by consumer groups, and the consumer finance industry's con-
tention that class actions should be eliminated in Truth in Lend-
ing cases. 10 7 The amended section 130 was designed to make
class actions viable under the Truth in Lending Act because
Congress felt that " 'potential class action liability is an important
encouragement to the voluntary compliance which is so neces-
sary to insure nationwide adherence to uniform disclosure.' "108
It was also intended to shield the business community from the
massive claims made possible by the language of the original
section 130.109
In Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 110 the Seventh Cir-
cuit determined that class actions were not barred under the
original Truth in Lending Act. Goldman relied on both Haynes
and the 1974 amendments to persuade the Seventh Circuit that
his action fell within rule 23(b)(3) and that the district court
abused its discretion by not allowing the suit to proceed as a class
action. The district court relied in part on its belief that class
actions are incompatible with Truth in Lending cases"' and in
106 Depository Institutions Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408, 88 Stat. 1518
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)). Congress amended this section again on March
23, 1976 (effective March 23, 1977) to increase a creditor's maximum exposure in a
class action to the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth. Con-
sumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 260 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2, 1976)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 1975)). This amendment, passed after Goldman was decided, alters the analysis
of.the case's effects only slightly. See note 123 infra.
"'7See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1973). This is a 1973 report on
S.2101, which is not the bill that ultimately became law. The civil liability provisions in
S.2101, however, are identical to the provisions in H.R. 11221, the bill that did become
law, and the substance of the arguments concerning the limitation did not change in
the following year. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. H1O, 270-73 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974) (re-
marks of Reps. Sullivan, Wylie & Rinaldo).
I S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973). But cf. Postow v. Oriental Bldg.
Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1975) (the Act neither requires nor recommends class
actions, but leaves such a determination to the discretion of the courts).
""9See S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1973).
"" 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974). In Haynes, the Court of Appeals noted that trial
courts are usually afforded great latitude in determining the fairest and most efficient
methods of adjudication under rule 23(b)(3). The court subsequently concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying class action certification on the legal
theory that the procedural device of such actions was incompatible with the substantive
ends to which the Act is addressed. Id. at 1163.
"I See text accompanying note 104 supra. This notion was expressly rejected in
Haynes. 503 F.2d at 1163.
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part on its concern over the possibility of enormous damages. 1 12
In light of Haynes and the amendment of section 130, the
Seventh Circuit's reversal of the lower court's decision to deny
class certification is not surprising; but instead of remanding
the question to the district court for reconsideration in light of
the statutory and judicial developments of the previous four
years, 113 the court resolved the class certification question based
on its own analysis of the effects of these developments.
The Haynes opinion delineated four considerations that the
Seventh Circuit in Goldman deemed important in evaluating the
appropriateness and desirability of granting plaintiffs class ac-
tion status under the original section 130 of the Act. They were:
(1) the allegation of actual damages; (2) whether or not the indi-
vidual recovery of twice the finance charge in the transactions
for most of the class members would exceed the statutory min-
imum; (3) the number of prospective class members; (4) the
difficulty in fulfilling the notice requirements of rule 23(b)(3)."' 4
The second and third considerations relate directly to projecting
the amount of recovery that could be granted in a class action
involving no waiver of the minimum statutory damages awards
for the class members. The Goldman panel found that in asses-
sing the unfairness of allowing a class action to proceed under
the original section 130, the Haynes court evaluated the hardship
that the class action damages award would impose upon the
defendant and the extent to which the individual recoveries of
most of the class members would have exceeded the minimum
amount of recovery.
15
The amended section 130 established a maximum recovery
and eliminated the statutory minimum recovery in class actions;
consequently, the court accorded the second and third Haynes
considerations little weight in determining whether Goldman's
suit should proceed as a class action. 1 6 The court noted that
Goldman alleged two alternative measures of actual damages
and that he satisfied the prerequisites of rule 23(a). Finding that
the notice requirements of rule 23(b)(3) represented no barrier,
because the class members were easily identifiable from the
"'2 See text accompanying note 103 supra. This concern was obviated by the 1974
amendments. See note 106 supra & accompanying text.
113 The Fifth Circuit followed this course of action in Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales,
Inc., 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975), after recognizing that the 1974 amendments posed
some new problems of their own. Accord, Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co. 526 F.2d
367 (5th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying note 127 infra.





6 Id. at 16.
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bank's records, and that common questions of law and fact pre-
dominated, the court determined that in this case a class action
was superior to other methods of adjudication. Accordingly, the
circuit court found that the district judge abused his discretion
by failing to allow the suit to proceed as a class action. 117 It then
remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
class members."1
8
The Seventh Circuit's decision to reverse the lower court's
denial of class certification was sound because the district court
based its decision on considerations that were both improper and
irrelevant in light of the 1974 amendments. The circuit court
should have remanded the entire question to the district court,
however, rather than deciding itself whether class certification
was appropriate. The complexity of the statute of limitations
issue and the resulting uncertainty concerning the rationale the
circuit court would adopt to justify its conclusion made it exceed-
ingly difficult for counsel to consider and brief the class action
question adequately. 19 The court, therefore, did not hear all of
the pertinent arguments and was not in a position to properly
evaluate all of the relevant considerations before rendering its
decision. This may account for a number of deficiencies in the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning.
The major flaw in the Goldman court's analysis is its failure
to take into account all of the effects of the 1974 amendments.
The court did note that the amended version of section 130(a)
eliminates some of the problems caused by the original ver-
sion,120 but it failed to recognize that the amended version cre-
ates new problems that must be taken account of before a deci-
sion on a class certification motion can be rendered.' 2 1
Amended section 130(a) raises significant difficulties for the
class representative attempting to satisfy the requirement of rule
23(a)(4) that the representative will "fairly and adequately rep-
resent the interests of the class": his vigorous representation of
the class' interests may be contrary to his own self-interest. In
1 1 7 Id.
"Id. at 22.
119 For example, if the court had held that no cause of action accrued until a fi-
nance charge was imposed inconsistently with a disclosure, the composition and size of
the class would differ from that of the injured class resulting from a decision that the
violation occurred at the time of disclosure but the statute of limitations was tolled until
the consumer had perceived his injury.
120 532 F.2d at 16. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
121 For a general discussion of the effects of the 1974 amendments on class actions
under rule 23, see LeValley & Walker, Truth-in-Lending Class Actions Under Amended Sec-
tion 130, 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 471 (1976).
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Weathersby v. Fireside Thrift Co. ,122 the court posed the problem as
follows:
The fundamental problem is the limitation on total re-
covery, which serves to penalize plaintiffs for represent-
ing a large class. Since the outside limits of the size of
the pie are rigid, plaintiffs will be prompted to scale
down the size of their class to permit larger individual
recoveries. But a class of modest size would still disad-
vantage the named plaintiffs. For example, any class of
more than 1000 members would permit individual re-
coveries of less than $100.123
The court concluded that the new legislation works at cross
purposes with rule 23 by making it disadvantageous for a class
representative to satisfy the mandate of 23(a)(4) to "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.' 2 4 The amount
of maximum recovery is constrained further by the requirement
that damages not exceed one percent of the creditor's net
worth.' 25 The implications of this requirement and the debilitat-
ing effect that it may have on maintaining class actions was noted
and explained in Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc. 1
26
Another important criteria, now to be considered in
view of the amendment to § 1640(a) [Truth in Lending
Act section 130(a)], is the [rule] 23(a) requirement that
the class representative be able fairly and adequately to
protect class interests. Under § 1640(a) as amended, the
recovery by a class member may be in a lesser amount
than would be the case in an individual action. By way
122 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,640, at 88,179-82 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
1
23 Id. at 88,180. The Act has been amended against since Weathersby to increase the
upper limit from $100,000 to $500,000, effective March 23, 1977. Consumer Leasing
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3), 90 Stat. 260 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1640(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2, 1976)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1975)). This increase, however, merely requires that the class size be kept under 5,000
members in order to prevent a situation where the class representative receives less in
damages from a class action than he would from an individual action. Such an increase
is inconsequential with respect to the court's analysis in light of class sizes such as the
130,000 member class in Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust, 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). See text accompanying note 97 supra.
124 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,640, at 88,181 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
125 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970))
(amended 1976).
126 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975). The observations of the Fifth Circuit retain valid-
ity because this requirement was left unchanged by the recent amendments. Compare 15
U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2, 1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V
1975).
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of a hypothetical, let us assume that Alto, a trailer sales
company, has a net worth of $500,000.... Appellants
contend that at least 121 trailer purchasers did not re-
ceive pre-transaction disclosure statements from Alto.
In a successful class action without proof of actual dam-
ages, each class member would receive less than $42,
dividing one percent of the assumed net worth among
class members. Suing individually, on the other hand,
each class member could recover double the amount of
the finance charge up to $1,000, and, in any event, a
minimum of $100.127
Instead of ascertaining that Goldman satisfied the require-
ments of rule 23(a)(4), the Seventh Circuit noted simply that
"Goldman's withdrawal as counsel in the case removed the
judge's major objection to his acting as the representative party
for the class.' 28 This terse observation is inadequate, however,
because the district judge made his determination in light of the
original section 130(a) with no consideration of the problems
posed by the amended version. 129 Failing to perceive the ramifi-
cations of amended section 130(a), the circuit court never de-
termined what the approximate class size would be. Goldman
might be inclined to minimize the class size in order to maximize
his damages award; in doing so, however, he would fail to satisfy
the requirements of rule 23(a)(4). Consequently, before deciding
whether Goldman should be allowed to act as the class represen-
tative, the circuit court should have scrutinized carefully the
composition of the class that he proposed to represent.
Another vital consideration ignored by the Seventh Circuit
is that a class action under rule 23(b)(3) requires a determination
of "the interest of members of the class in individually control-
ling the prosecution . . . of separate actions.' 1 3 0 Because the
Goldman court made no determination of approximate class size,
it could not evaluate the effect of class size on the amount of
127511 F.2d at 118.
128 532 F.2d at 15 n.6.
129 The district judge's objection reflected a concern that rule 23 should not be
used as a device for the solicitation of litigation by attorneys. For a discussion of this
problem, see Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
note 12 supra. Moreover, when attorneys bring actions on behalf of themselves and
proposed classes, courts are suspicious that they might be seeking to use the rule 23
mechanism merely to garner a large fee award as part of a settlement. See Kline v.
Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). See generally note 99supra.
130 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
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each class member's recovery. Such an assessment is essential
because under amended section 130 class members will almost
always recover less than they would if they proceeded indi-
vidually.' 3 1 As the amount that each class member will recover in
damages decreases, each member has an increasing interest "in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense" of a separate
action.
Also relevant to determining whether rule 23(b)(3) require-
ments have been satisfied is the manageability of the suit as a
class action.' 32 The Seventh Circuit in Goldman noted that the
bank's installment contract records would facilitate identification
of the class members. 133 The court failed to consider, however,
that the apportionment of damages among class members could
present serious difficulties in manageability, especially if many of
the class members seek to recover actual damages. Moreover, if
the size of the class is such that the aggregate of the actual
damages exceeds the maximum amount allowed by the statute,
the court would be faced with the difficult task of apportioning
equitably the damages award. Additionally, if the bank has small
claims against a large number of delinquent cardholders who are
also class members, these may have to be asserted as compulsory
counterclaims, thereby causing the suit to be unwieldy as a class
action.1
3 4
A final consideration is that class size directly affects the cost
of notifying class members that a class action has been instituted
under rule 23(c)(2). 135 Without a determination of approximate
class size there could be no estimate of the cost of notification;
therefore, the court was unable to determine whether Goldman
was able to bear the inital cost of providing notice to all class
members in a rule 23(b)(3) action. If the class prevails in the suit,
the cost of this notification process may be recovered from the
131 See text accompanying notes 111-16 supra.
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
133 532 F.2d at 16.
3 4 See Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 609 (N.D. I1. 1973).
13' See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-79 (1974); FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) reads as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall di-
rect to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if
he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
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defendant, over and above the damages award. 136 Consequently,
although a maximum damages limit exists, the cost of notifica-
tion could constitute a substantial additional burden to the cred-
itor if the class size is very large. In light of Congress' attempt to
limit a creditor's potential liability in such class action suits, high
notification costs resulting from a large class size may justify a
court's conclusion that a class action is not "superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy."13
7
IV. INTERPLAY OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DECISION AND CLASS ACTION QUESTION
The most surprising aspect of Goldman is that the ramifica-
tions of the court's interpretation when the statute of limitations
begins to run are never considered in determining whether class
certification should be granted. This omission is disturbing be-
cause the circuit court's resolution of the statute of limitations
issue directly affects the size and composition of the class. Under
the approach taken in Wachtel v. West138 for closed end transac-
tions,139 the class in Goldman would consist of all those credit
card holders who received or first used their BankAmericard
during the year before the date the action was commenced
(July 8, 1971)-the date on which the contract for the extension
of credit was "consummated." Under the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion, the class would consist of all those BankAmericard holders
who first incurred a finance charge during the year prior to
July 8, 1971.' 40 Because it is likely that most credit card holders
tend to use their card soon after receipt, the class size under
the Wachtel approach should approximate the number of cards
issued during that year. On the other hand, because of the
numerous influences that affect when a credit card holder will
first incur a finance charge, 4 1 an a priori prediction of class size
under the Goldman approach is much more difficult; the many
13r 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970)).
137 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
138 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
139 See notes 38-39 supra & accompanying text.
140 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
14 For example, when a credit card holder will incur a finance charge may depend
on whether he plans to use the card to buy things he cannot afford or solely to avoid
having to carry too much cash. Beyond his planned use, his actual use of the card may
be altered by a change in his overall financial situation or a temporary liquidity crisis.
Alternatively, he may simply forget to pay his bill within the applicable "free-ride"
period.
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influences on the composition of the class under Goldman in-
crease the variability of class size.
This variance in class size from year to year has significant
implications for both the consumer and the creditor. As ex-
plained earlier, because the maximum recovery for a class action
is fixed, an increase in class size tends to diminish the recovery of
each class member.142 Due to this volatility of class size, the dam-
ages award to a class member may vary greatly depending upon
when an action is brought. This will influence both a consumer's
decision to act as a class representative and a class member's
decision to request exclusion from the class.
Under Goldman, a consumer contemplating bringing a class
action has one year after a finance charge is imposed to bring
suit against the creditor. If the class size shortly after imposition
of the finance charge is prohibitively high, he could reasonably
delay bringing an individual action for up to one year in the
hope that the class size will decrease to a number that will make a
class action advantageous. Each member of this smaller class
would receive a higher damages award; however, the injured
consumers who will no longer be in the relevant class and who
were ignorant of their right to bring an individual suit will for-
feit their cause of action.
1 43
These same considerations are relevant to a consumer,
notified that he is part of a class action, who must decide
whether or not to request exclusion. The consumer's attorney
must be aware of the effect of class size on his client's potential
damages award so that he can evaluate whether an individual
suit would be preferable. The lawyer must also consider the
variability of class size because the class member will have a cer-
tain amount of time (depending on when his finance charge was
first imposed) before the one year statute of limitations bars his
cause of action. Consequently, after evaluating the potential
benefits of the class action, the consumer may find it advanta-
geous to wait and see if another class action with a smaller class
will be brought some time before his cause of action is barred.
142 See text accompanying notes 122-27, 130-31 supra.
143 A class action attorney should be aware of these considerations so that he can
advise his client of the available options and their ramifications. Moreover, the situation
may present serious ethical questions. Although the attorney must zealously represent
his client's interests, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7, query whether he
possesses a responsibility to other potential class members. Note that if an attorney
actually functions as class counsel, added responsibility inheres because an element of
public service is involved. Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (D.D.C. 1973),
modified sub norm. Pete v. UMW Welfare and Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc). Kiser is discussed in 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1354 (1974).
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The variability of class size poses a problem for the creditor
by making it difficult for him to control or estimate his potential
liability for any given year. In general, the upper limit governing
class action damages awards will make the creditor's best strategy
the inclusion of all persons with potential claims arising out of
the violation alleged in the original action within the class. This
proposition, however, is subject to two caveats. As class size in-
creases and the potential damages award to each class member
decreases, the number of persons who will opt out of the class
action and bring an individual action to obtain a higher damages
award may increase. At the same time, the likelihood that the
court will deny class certification also increases (either for rea-
sons of manageability or because the damages award to each
class member is too low or too difficult to apportion). The result
is a large number of individual suits with the $100 statutory
minimum damages award. The creditor could mathematically
estimate his potential liability as a function of class size subject to
these constraints. Under the Wachtel approach, he would have a
reasonable estimate of class size that could be used to estimate
his potential liability for the coming year. Moreover, he could
control the extent of his potential liability by varying the number
of cards that are issued. Under the Goldman approach, on the
other hand, not only does the creditor lose this ability to control
his potential liability, but he faces a formidable task in even
estimating his potential liability for the coming year. Conse-
quently, the court's interpretation of the statute of limitations
issue indirectly imposes a greater burden on both the consumer
and the consumer credit industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The complexity of open end credit plans poses problems for
uninformed consumers and conscientious legislators endeavor-
ing to protect them. A prominent feature of most open end
plans is a uniform agreement with a large number of customers.
Consequently, a false disclosure or breach of contract by the
creditor ordinarily would create an appropriate situation for a
class action; however, adaptation of the class action mechanism
to false or misleading disclosures under open end credit ar-
rangements governed by the Truth in Lending Act has not pro-
ceeded smoothly. One problem has been determining whether
the applicable statute of limitations begins to run before the im-
position of a finance charge. In Goldman v. First National Bank,
the Seventh Circuit faced the unenviable task of deciding and
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reconciling intricate Truth in Lending Act class action and stat-
ute of limitations issues.
The first question was when the Act's one year statute of
limitations should begin to run where a false, ambiguous, or
inaccurate disclosure has been made concerning an open end
credit plan. In the context of closed end plans, previous cases
had held that the limitations period commences as soon as the
credit transaction is consummated. The nature of the open end
arrangement, however, created a situation in which the con-
sumer had no reason to be aware that a disclosure was inade-
quate until a finance charge was imposed. Accordingly, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the statute of limita-
tions should run from the time of the deficient disclosure and
ruled that the statute proceeded only upon imposition of the
finance charge.
The class action question was decided in light of the 1974
amendments to the Truth in Lending Act. The court down-
played the importance of class size and composition in its
analysis because the amendments eliminated the ominous threat
of a crushing damages award in a class action under the Act.
This lack of attention to class size was unfortunate, however,
because the amendments make it difficult for a class representa-
tive to satisfy the requirements of rule 23(a)(4) and for the suit to
constitute a legitimate class action under rule 23(b)(3). Its failure
to determine class size and composition thus prevented the
Seventh Circuit from determining satisfactorily whether Goldman
should proceed as a class action.
Surprisingly, the court did not consider how its interpreta-
tion of the statute of limitations issue affected the class certifica-
tion motion; the interaction of these issues may influence class
size and composition. Additionally, the interdependence of the
statute of limitations and class action problems adds complexities
to the consumer's decision to be involved in a class action and the
creditor's estimation of potential liability.
The statute of limitations question was an issue of first im-
pression. Although the decision in Goldman was appropriate to
the facts of the case, the Seventh Circuit employed broad lan-
guage that may be construed in the future to undermine the
Truth in Lending Act's scheme of private enforcement by deny-
ing a cause of action to an injured consumer with a valid com-
plaint. The considerations relevant to a class action certification
motion under the Act were altered by the 1974 amendments. In
this context, Goldman provides an important post-amendment
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contribution to the question of the feasibility of class actions
in the consumer transaction area. Recognition of Goldman's
strengths and weaknesses will help prevent both retrogression
in consumer credit law and confusion about maintaining class
actions under the Truth in Lending Act.
